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1 Introduction
The most general notion of object has its modern home in the first-
order classical logic with identity. In this paper, we argue that the ap-
paratus for speaking of objects finds its proper place among a wider 
logical setting. The purpose of this paper is to explain and defend 
this thesis. One of the benefits of our analysis is that it makes possible 
to isolate the logical principles that are characteristic of the notion 
of object.
The wider apparatus of logic is brought about in virtue of two 
contentions. The first one is that hypothetical and general statements 
are the fundamental and primitive notions that make reasoning pos-
sible. In section 5, we briefly try to argue for this claim. Our ar-
gument relies on a fastened view between logic and inference. The 
second contention is that concept quantification is a coherent and 
admissible form of logical expression. Concept quantification has 
been famously attacked, either for being incoherent, or as a form of 
(extensional) second-order quantification lying outside the province 
of logic. After a brief discussion of conventionalism in logic in sec-
tion 2, we discuss some theses of Willard Quine that are pertinent to 
our discussion. This is done in section 3 and, forthwith, a defense of 
a form of second-order logic is mounted. In the following section 4, 
we make a small digression on the principle of induction and on the 
benefits of its enunciation with concept quantification.
In sections 6 and 7, we finally describe the logical principles that 
articulate the notion of object. A small concluding section closes the 
paper.
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2 Conventionalism in logic
There is an interesting, albeit failed, account of logic. It is the view 
that explicates logic as the adoption of certain linguistic conventions. 
For instance, adopting (or not) tertium non datur would be a matter 
of convention within a particular linguistic framework. The conven-
tionalist strategy can be compared to the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometries. Denying the parallel postulate is not a contradiction 
in terms or a failure to describe correctly some reality, but rather 
adopting another kind of geometry. If mathematicians came to ac-
cept different geometries side by side, why shouldn’t philosophers 
accept also different logics side by side? Why can’t we be free to 
adopt different logics, different ways of reasoning, in order to pursue 
more efficiently some inquiries?
A conventionalist view of logic would, in one single sweep, ex-
plain why the truths of logic are of a different kind from empirical 
truths, and why they are analytic and a priori. Of course, this would 
be an important step in the enterprise of logical positivism. A logic 
would merely be an adopted calculus where, by conventional stipu-
lation, some inferences are permitted and some principles are as-
serted. The stipulations would be seen as implicit definitions of the 
terms of the calculus.
Conventionalism in logic was refuted by Quine more than sev-
enty years ago. The difficulty lies in that logic itself is presupposed in 
establishing non-trivial conventions.1 Suppose that we want to estab-
lish conventions for the if-idiom. We may start by laying down the 
following convention:
If x and z are true sentences, y is a sentence and z is the result of substitut-
ing the letter ‘p’ for x and the letter ‘q’ for y in ‘If p then q’, then y is true.
Note, however, that the convention uses the if-idiom itself, as well as 
the and-idiom and, implicitly, the all-idiom. If we do not understand 
these idioms beforehand and know how to operate with them, the 
above convention does not get off the ground. I include this Quinean 
analysis here because, later in the paper, I will argue that both the if-
1 See specially part III of Quine 76. Cf. also the short and witty article by 
Carroll 1895.
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idiom (the idiom of hypothetical claims) and the all-idiom (the idiom 
of general claims) are the fundamental and primitive notions which 
make logic possible.
3 Concept quantification
The above argument of Quine was one of his first attacks on logical 
positivism, an attack which culminated in the famous Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism paper (see Quine 1953b) and its attendant rejection of 
the analytic-synthetic distinction. However, and this is important to 
notice, the paper is actually only an attack on a certain class of ana-
lytic statements, viz. the ones that can be turned into a logical truth 
by putting synonyms for synonyms. The class of logical truths is not 
itself subjected to attack in Quine’s paper. Quine’s real target is the 
reification of the notion of meaning, an attack mounted through the 
notion of synonymy. Presumably, if the notion of synonymy were 
acceptable, meanings could be reified: indeed, they could be defined 
as equivalent classes of terms under the relation of synonymy. The 
attack on synonymy had great success but, as we will see, combined 
with another thesis of Quine, had an unfortunate and important col-
lateral damage.
There are many problems with the notion of reified proposi-
tion (as meanings of sentences) but Quine is famous for rejecting 
an ontology of propositions on the basis that it is hard to account 
for their identity conditions. It is part and parcel of the notion of 
object that the same object can be referred to by means of different 
descriptions or from different perspectives. Identity, as stressed by 
Gottlob Frege, is an important part of the apparatus of linguistic 
reference to objects. Quine also stresses quantification. At any rate, 
the most general notion of object finds its modern home in first-
order classical calculus with identity. If one takes seriously the view 
that the notion of object is a quintessential metaphysical notion, then 
first-order classical logic with identity must be deeply ingrained with 
metaphysical presuppositions. I will recount a ‘logico/metaphysical 
story’ on how the notion of object is brought into logic. The aim is to 
make explicit, via inferential articulations, the metaphysical presup-
positions of this notion.
Speaking of objects, as it is remarked in Parsons (2008: 10), just 
is using the linguistic devices of singular terms, predication, identity 
and quantification to make serious statements. Meanings and propo-
sitions do not qualify as objects. According to Quine, they do not so 
qualify because they miss at least one of the requirements, the one 
on identity. However, as Quine 1953a is careful to point out, he does 
not deny that words and statements are meaningful. He just denies 
that they have a meaning, if this ‘having’ is interpreted as more than 
a mere figure of speech. We, humans, use meaningful statements all 
the time. The point is that using them is not the same thing as nam-
ing them, nor does it presuppose that we can name them (i.e., that 
propositions can be treated as objects).
However, Quine goes a step too far when he defends that quan-
tification is not only a necessary condition for speaking of objects but 
that it is also a sufficient condition. To be is to be the value of a bound 
variable, in Quine’s famous, but ill-conceived, dictum. Quine argues 
for this thesis in On what there is? (Quine 1953a: 15) where he also 
lays down his doctrine of ontological commitment. The argument of 
Quine proceeds via an analysis of complex descriptive names which 
do not refer. He analyzes these names via Russell’s theory of de-
scriptions and points out that the ontological commitment is carried 
out by the bound variables. Notice, however, that Russell’s theory 
relies on the full apparatus of first-order classical logic with identity: 
it needs predication, quantification and identity. Therefore, what is 
argued by Quine is that in the presence of this linguistic apparatus 
(the apparatus for speaking of objects), ontological commitment is 
carried out by the bound variables. So far, so good. However, to 
conclude from this argument that bound variables carry ontological 
commitments in the absence of the full apparatus is a non sequitur.
Quine’s emphasis on quantification is right in one direction - 
speaking of objects presupposes the availability of the apparatus of 
quantification (with ontological commitment) - but wrong-headed in 
the other - that the mere use of the apparatus of quantification signals 
ontological commitments. The collateral damage is, of course, that 
quantifying over propositions (or, in general, over concepts) does not 
make sense. As I said above, I will present a ‘logico-metaphysical’ 
story on how the notion of object is brought into logic. In this story, 
the notion of generality is primitive and conceptually prior to the 
notion of object and, by itself, does not signal ontological commit-
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ments. It is merely a means of expression.
Before I tell my story, let me make a few remarks. I start with 
an example: ‘ ’, where ‘P’ is a second-order propositional 
bound variable. This expression, I submit, makes perfectly good 
sense.2 On our view of propositional generality, an instantiation of a 
universal (second-order) propositional quantification is not obtained 
by converting each occurrence of the quantified variable into an ex-
pression that names, but rather into an expression that propounds (i.e., 
a meaningful sentence). That which can be propounded is essentially 
open-ended and unfinishable, depending on linguistic and concep-
tual resources of whose limits we have no real conception. It is im-
possible to survey all propositions or concepts because ‘the attempt 
to survey reason itself fails: reason can transcend whatever it can 
survey’ (Putnam 1998: 119).
It is important to point out that the role given to meaningful sen-
tences in the conclusion of the elimination rule for universal propo-
sitional quantification is one in which they appear in positions of use. 
Let me give an example: ‘Bustopher is a fat cat  Bustopher is a fat 
cat’ is an instantiation of ‘ ’. Do notice that the expression 
‘Bustopher is a fat cat’ appears in positions of use in the sentence 
‘Bustopher is a fat cat  Bustopher is a fat cat’. Even though the no-
tion of proposition does not have the right content to allow proposi-
2 During a presentation of this work, I mentioned that it makes perfectly 
good sense to say that every proposition implies itself. With his customary polite-
ness, Ricardo Santos pointed to me that I probably did not want to use the word 
‘implies’ here. Implication is reserved for inference, as when one says that the 
sentence ‘The cat is on the mat and the dog is in the garden’ implies the sentence 
‘The dog is in the garden’. The word ‘implies’ is part of the metalanguage and 
cannot function as a sentential operator. For this function, one should use instead 
the conditional ‘if … then …’ as in ‘If the cat is on the mat and the dog is in the 
garden then the dog is in the garden’. Of course, this gives rise to a grammatical 
problem: to say ‘every so is such that if so then so’ is not proper English. Locu-
tions like ‘every’ or ‘for all’ demand to be followed by noun phrases. Grammar 
pushes us to say something like ‘every proposition is such that if it holds, then it 
holds’. In a nutshell, in our example, grammar demands ordinary language to 
treat propositions as objects (and truth as a property thereof). This grammatical 
objection is taken very seriously by some authors. See, for instance, the critique 
of Burgess (2005: 211ff). Grammar and ‘common usage’ do not have, however, a 
good repute as a guide to philosophical or scientific inquiry (see the caustic Rus-
sell 1953).
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tions to function as objects in the range of a quantification, I am argu-
ing that it has a content which permits their use within the all-idiom 
in the manner which I have just described. In actual instantiations, 
the question of whether a sequence of symbols counts as express-
ing a proposition can only be answered by way of interpretation and 
public agreement. It is, irredeemably, a matter of interpretation. It 
is certainly right to say that, in meaningful exchange, interpretation 
always lurks.3
4 Digression on the natural numbers
Given the coherence of propositional and concept quantification, a 
refusal to accept this kind of quantification is tantamount to a prohi-
bition to engage in concept building and expression. It is an unwill-
ingness to go on in the direction of a greater linguistic expressive-
ness. Let me make a brief digression and discuss an example from 
mathematics: the principle of mathematical induction:
The use of this principle is, directly or indirectly, behind almost all 
of the mathematics that is indispensable for science. In the light of 
the discussion of the last section, I purposely enunciate the principle 
with a (second-order) concept quantification because this is a way to 
express its universality, in the sense that the properties to which the 
principle of induction applies are not parochial to a fixed language. 
The principle rather applies to properties whose expression is part of 
3 The notion of propositional quantification has some superficial affinities 
with substitutional quantification. There are two crucial differences, however. 
The instantiations of a universal propositional quantification are not obtained 
from sentences of a given fixed formal language. As a consequence, propositional 
quantification is not amenable to semantic ascent and cannot be reformulated as 
quantification over a certain fixed domain of sentences together with the concur-
rence of a truth (or satisfaction) predicate. Moreover, in our notion of quantifica-
tion, sentences formed using the very apparatus of propositional quantification 
can themselves be used as instantiations of universal quantifications. In other 
words, contrary to substitutional quantification, propositional quantification ac-
cepts impredicativity and, when generalized to concept quantification, it allows 
for the formation of impredicative concepts.
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an open-ended process.
The expert reader knows that the mathematics indispensable for 
science only requires enunciations of the principle of induction with-
in particular formal languages.4 We can certainly opt for this kind 
of parochialism with respect to science as it is currently practiced. 
Nevertheless, the principle as enunciated above not only has a regula-
tive force - in the sense that the evidence for the truth of its formal 
(schematic) enunciations are best seen as coming from the general 
principle5 - but it also sheds light on the relationships between prov-
ability and truth in mathematics.
Arithmetic, when developed in a formal language, is subjected to 
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. According to this theorem, 
under mild technical conditions, a consistent theory of arithmetic is 
necessarily incomplete, i.e., there are always sentences of the formal 
language which are neither provable nor refutable (their negations 
are not provable). If we further see the system of arithmetic as aim-
ing at proving true arithmetical sentences, we can say that there are 
always true sentences of arithmetic which are not provable in the 
given formal system.
The proof of Gödel’s theorem relies essentially on the complete 
formalization of the arithmetical theory. If the principle of induction 
is formulated as above, with concept quantification, Gödel’s theo-
rem simply does not apply. This state of affairs should not come as 
a surprise because in any formal deductive system the statement of 
the principle of induction is, by necessity, restricted.6 Not only is this 
4 For instance, in the language of set theory. Mathematical logicians have 
studied in detail what exactly is necessary - in terms of induction or set com-
prehension - for proving ordinary theorems of mathematics (for a reference, see 
Simpson 1999). For the connection of this kind of work with science and the 
indispensability arguments, I recommend Feferman 1998.
5 This simple point was given its due weight by Kreisel (1967: 148).
6 The observation about the open-endedness of concept formation is quite 
plain. Ditto for the observation that the principle of induction is open-ended. 
However, the following question and (especially) its answer are rather deep. Let 
be given a formal language of arithmetic. It has a delimited apparatus of concept 
formation and, therefore, a restricted amount of induction. Would it nevertheless 
be possible to set up a (consistent) theory in the formal language that would either 
prove or refute each sentence of that very same formal (and, hence, restricted) 
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observation in line with the open-endness of concept formation, but 
it also finds rigorous mathematical support in the theorem that the 
truth predicate for a formal language of arithmetic cannot be defined 
within the language itself.7
Wherein is exactly located the presumed gap between truth and 
provability intimated by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem? I sug-
gest that the gap, if it is a gap, lies in the open-endness of concept 
formation and, in our case, in the open-endness of numerical con-
cept formation.
5 The centrality of hypothetical and general statements
Inference is central to logic and reason. Without being able to move 
from premises to a conclusion, there is no reasoning. Logical truth 
is a particular case (or a degenerate case, as when we say that a point 
is a degenerate circle) of inference: one without premises. The de-
generate case is no substitute for the general case since logical truth 
alone does not account for the moves from statements to statements 
which characterize logic. It is an obvious point that it is impossible to 
set up a logical system without at least one inference rule. Without 
inference, there are only isolated proclamations.8
Suppose that the primitive man concludes that he is in danger 
from the information that there is a lion in the vicinity. A reflection 
on what he does, i.e., the move of concluding that he is danger from 
the knowledge that there is a lion in the vicinity, and the will (and ca-
pability) to express this movement, takes him to say ‘if there is a lion 
in the vicinity then I am in danger’. Hypothetical (or conditional) 
statements express, within language, the sanction of the linguistic act 
of drawing a conclusion under certain conditions. They are a fun-
damental form of logical expression and make possible a linguistic 
ascent, from linguistic act into linguistic expression, without which 
language? Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem says that this is impossible.
7 This is Tarski’s undefinability of truth theorem.
8 Such proclamatory discourse would marry well with the notion of language 
as consisting only of descriptions of reality. Interestingly, in Sellars 1997 it is argued 
that even perceptual statements can only count  as assertions insofar as they are 
inferentially articulated.
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there is no explicit reasoning.9,10
In the example above, a measure of generality is implicit. The con-
ditional sentence ‘if there is a lion in the vicinity then I am in dan-
ger’ operates like an inference ticket which can be cashed in all the 
appropriate situations.11 In the complete absence of generality, even 
though there is more in discourse than mere isolated proclamations, 
we are - in a sense - only a finite number of steps away from inferring 
all that can be concluded. Let us advance an argument for this thesis. 
Arguably, the main role of the elimination rules of a connective is to 
make possible the use of premises in which this connective occurs as 
the principal connective. It is plain that if the conditional is the only 
logical connective present in the premises of an argument, we would 
be only a finite number of steps away from inferring all that could be 
inferred via the elimination rule (i.e., via modus ponens).12,13 On the 
9 The content of hypothetical statements results from some distinguished 
roles in inference. More precisely, these are the roles carried out by the introduc-
tion and elimination rules of the natural deduction calculus. This calculus was 
invented by Gerhard Gentzen in 1935, and subsequently studied and expanded 
in Prawitz 1965.
10 The attentive reader can point that there are inferences with more than 
one premise, and that this fact calls for the notion of conjunction as well. This is 
correct, but not terribly interesting. There is a further factor that explains our 
simplified account: technically, as it will be pointed out, conjunctive claims can 
be expressed using hypothetical and general claims.
11 This point was made a long time ago by Ryle 1950.
12 The above argument is not as strong as the argument for the centrality of 
hypothetical statements. The caveat ‘in a sense’ is needed because the introdu-
tion rule for implication does allow the inference of infinitely many sentences 
(uninteresting as they may be). Nevertheless, we believe that it carries a certain 
weight. It would be nice to advance stronger and more perspicuous arguments for 
the centrality of general statements.
13 Frege 1984 also assigns a central role in logic to generality. Frege speaks 
of the scientific need to express laws and says that ‘in point of fact the distinction 
between law and particular fact cuts very deep’. Frege, on the other hand, does 
not accord a centrality to hypothetical statements. He sees them as truth func-
tional and, therefore, replaceable by the combination of negation and conjunction 
(cf. Frege 1980). Of course, Frege is right: truth-functional conditionals (as any 
truth functional connective) can even be written with the Sheffer stroke only. 
However, our analysis of truth-functionality is not yet in place. Our rendition of 
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other hand, generality releases reasoning from a pre-fixed enclosure 
into a boundlessness of inferential moves.
The sentence ‘ ’ is an example of a (true) general sen-
tence. Notice that the number of immediate inferences which can 
be drawn from it (via the elimination rule) is unbounded. General 
claims, as hypothetical claims, are also a primitive and unexplained 
notion, fundamental to logical expression. These claims can be made 
not only with respect to predicate positions, but also with respect to 
name positions. However, it is methodologically interesting to start 
with propositional generalities - as we did - because doing so only re-
quires the notion of proposition (i.e., of a meaningful sentence) and 
does not rely yet on any particular analysis of this notion.
At this juncture, it is worth remarking that the familiar propo-
sitional connectives can be introduced with the apparatus of hypo-
thetical and general propositional claims:14
These are the expressive definitions of the above connectives.15 It is 
known that the attendant notion of consequence gives rise to intu-
itionistic logic.16
logic is still on a prior and more general footing.
14 The definitions appear informally in sections 18 and 19 of Russell 1996. 
The formal definitions are due to Prawitz 1965.
15 For the reader unfamiliar with these definitions, let us discuss the defini-
tion of disjunction. In natural deduction, the elimination rule of disjunction is the 
following: If ‘P’ can be inferred from ‘A’ and if ‘P’ can be inferred from ‘B’, then 
‘P’ is a consequence of ‘A B’ (this is also known as discussion by cases). Given that 
concept quantification is allowed in our language, the definition of disjunction 
above mirrors the elimination rule just described. Mutatis mutandis for the other 
connectives. The introduction rules of the natural deduction calculus follow from 
the definitions.
16 The notion of consequence is the one originating from the rules of intro-
duction and elimination (for the conditional and the universal quantifier) of the 
natural deduction calculus (cf. footnote 9). It is a mathematical observation that 
these rules give rise to intuitionistic logic.
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6 The alethic ingredient
The previous section recounts the first part of our ‘logico/metaphys-
ical story’. The subsequent story narrates the appearance of the no-
tion of object and, in general, of the descriptive component of logic. 
We have already introduced the expressive ingredient of logic.17 Let 
us now introduce two other ingredients: firstly, the alethic ingredient 
(i.e., the logical apparatus for the notion of bivalent truth) and, in the 
next section, the ontic ingredient (i.e., the logical apparatus for the 
notion of object).
The alethic ingredient of logic only comes into play when we are 
dealing with a linguistic base whose semantics is taken to be unprob-
lematically bivalent. We start with a initial bit of language whose 
propositions are true or false, but not both (the principle of biva-
lence). For convenience, let us call them atomic propositions.18 We 
take that atomic propositions come in pairs, one called the opposite of 
the other (with switched truth values). The opposite of an opposite 
is the original atomic proposition. This is our rendition of bivalence. 
The inferential explication of bivalence can be done through the fol-
lowing laws:
where the letter ‘A’ stands for a sentence that expresses an atomic 
proposition (an atomic sentence), and ‘A’ stands for its opposite. The 
first law is a form of tertium non datur and can be elucidated by saying 
that an atomic proposition and its opposite exhaust the space of logi-
cal possibilities in the following sense: Whenever we want to infer a 
given proposition, it is enough to infer it from an atomic proposition 
17  Generalizations with respect to name positions (which will be discussed be-
low) are also part of the apparatus of the expressive component of logic, but they 
presuppose a previous analysis of the structure of predicative statements. For the 
record, the expressive definition of is the formula .
18 This is just a convenient way of speaking. There are no metaphysical con-
notations in the use of this terminology (not, for instance, connotations to Trac-
tarian Elementarsätze or semantical atomism) beyond what we have said: atomic 
propositions are either true or false, but not both.
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and to infer it from its opposite. The second principle is a form of ex 
falso quodlibet.19
If ‘A’ stands for an atomic sentence, it is easy to prove both that 
 and that .20 In other words, for atomic proposi-
tions, expressive negation is equivalent to (bivalent) opposition. Fur-
thermore, if we consider the sentences of the language built up from 
atomic sentences by means of propositional connectives (the con-
ditional, and negation, conjunction, disjunction, as defined above) 
- originating propositional sentences - it is easy to argue by induction on 
the build up of sentences, that the statements of the form
where ‘A’ now stands for a propositional sentence, are provable. Note 
that the above says that . It is now clear that the propositional 
fragment of the language obeys the laws of classical logic.
Our definitions of the propositional connectives are done in 
terms of propositional quantifications. It may cause some uneasiness 
the fact that the apparatus of propositional quantification is present 
in the propositional calculus (via the very definitions of the propo-
sitional connectives). The uneasiness is, however, uncalled for. In a 
sense, the apparatus of propositional quantification present in the 
midst of the propositional fragment is trumped by the alethic prin-
ciples. The familiar (self-enclosed) set up of the propositional calcu-
lus via truth tables may, on this view, be considered an ‘in your face’ 
manner of displaying the result of this trumping.
In the same vein, it is worth remarking explicitly that the alethic 
trumping mentioned above explains the compositional nature of the 
classical propositional calculus. The like-minded reader must have 
noticed that the semantics of propositional quantification cannot be 
fully compositional. The reason for this lies in the impredicativity of 
concept quantification and the attendant consequence that one must 
19 With the definitions of the propositional connectives above, the sentence 
in (ALE)1- is equivalent to , and the sentence in (ALE)2- is equivalent to 
.
20 The claim that  should be understood as an abbreviation for the pair 
of claims that  and that .
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deny that the sense of a second-order generalization is intelligible 
only if its instantiations are intelligible in advance of the generaliza-
tion itself.21 This observation effectively precludes a compositional 
semantics in general. However, in the presence of the alethic prin-
ciples, the restricted area of the propositional calculus is fully rooted 
in its bivalent beginnings, disarming - as it were - the role of the 
concept quantifications in its midst and, therefore, making it possible 
to cohere with a (compositional) truth-functional semantics.
7 The ontic ingredient
In the previous section, we brought into discussion a linguistic base 
whose semantics was taken to be unproblematically bivalent. For 
convenience, we called the elements of this linguistic base ‘atomic 
propositions’. The expressive devices of hypothetical and generality 
claims create their own cargo by permitting the expression of new 
propositions which, themselves, can be subjected to the expressive 
devices again. And so on. A quite diverse cargo is created. Even if the 
atomic base has an unproblematic bivalent semantics, the applica-
tion of these devices need not maintain language within such bivalent 
confines. What we have argued in the previous section is that they do 
if we restrict ourselves to the propositional calculus.
In this section, we further suppose that these atomic propositions 
have a predicative structure. For instance, we may say that Busto-
pher is a fat cat or that Mungojerrie and Rumpelteazer are twin cats. 
Proper names and predicate symbols mark places in sentences which 
are suitable for generalizations. They indeed mark different sorts of 
places, since proper names do not fit into predicate places nor vice 
versa. A sentence of the form ‘ , is a generalization 
of the sentence ‘Bustopher is a fat cat  Bustopher is a fat cat’, where 
‘b’ denotes Bustopher. It is a generalization with respect to the pred-
icate place (a concept quantification). We could further generalize in 
21 A second-order generalization may have instantiations which are not sim-
pler than the generalization itself since the bound second-order variable may be 
instantiated by formulas of arbitrary complexity. In this essay we are not discuss-
ing the semantics of concept quantification but it is clear that it must rely on a spe-
cies of a rule-following semantics. The reader can find an entertaining discussion 
of impredicativity in Ferreira 2006.
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the name place and write ‘ ’. First-order quanti-
fication is also a device for the expression of generalizations, through 
which a new manner of formation of concepts is allowed.
In order to deal with the first-order classical predicate calculus, 
we must extend our analysis of the atomic case to atomic formulas. 
In analogy with the last section, if the letter ‘A’ stands for a predica-
tive symbol (unary: to simplify), then ‘A’ stands for its opposite. The 
extended alethic principles take the form:
Disregarding the identity axioms, the inferential explication of the no-
tion of object can completed through the following principle:
Here is an elucidation of this principle: If for each object x, reasoning 
from the fact that x falls under M and from the fact that x falls un-
der K exhausts the space of logical possibilities, then reasoning from 
 and from a generic example falling under K also exhausts 
the space of logical possibilities.
Arguably, the principle (ONT) is a bit opaque on a first reading,22 
but we can frame it in a more familiar terminology: With the defi-
nitions of the propositional connectives and of the existential first-
order quantifier in footnote 17, (ONT) is equivalent to
It is also worth remarking that if there are only finitely many objects 
in the range of x, (ONT) is provable. For instance, if there are only 
two objects a and b, the principle takes the form
22 There is, however, no reason why the inferential explication of the notion 
of object must be prosaic.
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The rendition of the notion of object is given by the inferential rules 
which regulate the use of the ‘linguistic devices of singular terms, 
predication, identity and quantification’. (ONT) is part of this rendi-
tion. If I were pressed to elucidate its particular role in the notion of 
object, I would say that (ONT) conveys the notion of quantification 
over a closed totality.23
It is a simple exercise (via an inductive argument on the complex-
ity of formulas) to show that (ONT), together with the alethic prin-
ciples, entails that first-order formulas satisfy tertium non datur.24 The 
principles of classical logic for the first-order fragment follow suit.
8 Coda
Discourse about objects finds its modern home in first-order classical 
logic with identity. The main thesis of this paper is that logic is not a 
uniform terrain where all truths lie on a par. We have analyzed first-
order classical logic and showed that it decomposes into two main 
ingredients: a deeper and wider expressive component and, on top of 
it, a narrower descriptive component. We argued that hypothetical 
and general claims are fundamental to logic and part of its expressive 
component. In a sense, our argument is transcendental: these types 
of claims are what make logic possible. Another face of logic, formed 
by the alethic and ontic ingredients, flattens - so to speak - the ter-
rain on top of the expressive component giving us the descriptive 
language of first-order classical logic with identity. It is an important 
region in the landscape of language, lying among and on top of the 
larger and original expressive foundation.25
23 As we have noticed, (ONT) is provable if there is only a fixed finite num-
ber of objects in the range of ‘x’. In this case, the notion of quantification over 
a closed totality is given automatically by stating that the domain of quantifica-
tion has the given finite number of elements. For instance, if there are only two 
objects, we can write ‘ ’. It is only when the domain is 
limitless that (ONT) is needed.
24 Note that a particular case of (ONT) is that 
.
25 Versions of this paper were read at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Univer-
sidade do Porto (on the occasion of the conference The Logical Alien at 20) and at 
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